We examine the role of institutional investors in financial markets and in corporate governance. In many countries, institutional investors have become the predominant players in financial markets and their influence worldwide is growing, chiefly due to the privatization and development of pension fund systems. Moreover, foreign institutional investors are becoming a significant presence, bringing their trading habits and corporate governance preferences to international markets. In fact, we argue that the primary actors prompting change in many corporate governance systems are institutional investors, often foreign institutional investors. In other countries the role of institutional investors is limited. Instead, large blockholders, often in the form of individuals, family groups, other corporations, or lending institutions are the dominant players.
Introduction
Managers' activities are potentially constrained by a number of factors that constitute and influence the governance of the corporations that they direct.
Examples of these factors include the board of directors, who set policies and monitor managerial actions, debt constraints, governmental laws and regulations, labor agreements, the market for corporate control, and even the competitive environment. Broadly speaking, these can be thought of as either internal control mechanisms (such as the board) or external control mechanisms (for example, the market for corporate control). An increasingly important external control mechanism affecting governance worldwide is the role of the institutional investor. Institutional investors can exert direct influence on management's activities through their ownership, and indirect influence by their ability to trade their shares. In this paper we consider the role of institutional investors in corporate governance, the motivation for that role, and how the role has changed during the recent past.
Before assessing the role of institutional investors in corporate governance, we must first define what we mean by corporate governance.
Recent research has viewed the concept in different ways. Gillan and Starks (1998) define corporate governance as "the system of laws, rules, and factors that control operations at a company." They highlight that a firm's governance comprises the set of structures that provide boundaries for the firm's operations. This set of structures includes participants in corporate activities, such as managers, workers, and suppliers of capital, the returns to those participants, and the constraints under which they operate. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance in terms of the economic interests of the participants. In particular, they refer to corporate governance as dealing "…with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment." Similarly, Zingales (1998) defines corporate governance as "…the complex set of constraints that shape the ex-post bargaining over the quasi-rents generated by the firm."
The need for governance derives from the potential conflicts of interest among participants (stakeholders) in the corporate structure. These conflicts of interest, often referred to as agency problems, arise from two main sources. First, different participants have different goals and preferences. Second, the participants have imperfect information as to each others' actions, knowledge, and preferences. Berle and Means (1932) are credited as being among the first to address these conflicts by focusing on the separation of corporate ownership from corporate management -commonly referred to as the separation of ownership and control. Berle and Means noted that this separation, absent other corporate governance mechanisms, provides managers with the ability to act in their own self-interest rather than in the interests of shareholders.
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Corporate governance practices have evolved since the time of Berle and Means (1932) , primarily in response to changes in the corporate environment.
The evolution in corporate governance, which has varied internationally, has been particularly strong in countries where the banking, capital markets, and legal systems have undergone dramatic change. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that investor protection and corporate governance are stronger where the legal system is based on common law as opposed to civil law. Further, governance changes have been prevalent in countries with relatively high levels of institutional investment. In fact, we argue that the primary actors prompting change in many corporate governance systems are institutional investors, often foreign institutional investors. We first present the theoretical arguments for the involvement of institutional investors in shareholder monitoring. A short history of institutional ownership and activism in the United States and other countries is then followed by a discussion of the efficacy of such activism. We also examine how the legal environment in which a company operates can impact governance structures and ownership structures, and discuss differences in ownership structures around the world. We then consider the implications of these different ownership structures and how different owners may interact thus affecting the role of institutional investors as owners. After a brief discussion of the evolving environment in which corporations operate, we conclude the paper.
Rationale for Institutional Shareholder Involvement in Corporate Governance
In a number of countries institutional investors have become a dominant presence in financial markets. Assets held by institutional investors have also been growing in other financial markets. For example, by the mid-1990s, institutional investors owned 76.5% of outstanding equities in the U.K., 59.8% in France and 39% in Germany.
Further, total financial assets held by institutions in each of these countries grew by over 50% during the 1990-1995 time period (Conference Board, 1998).
Although institutional investors have not played as prominent a role in emerging markets, pension reform has started to influence the financial holdings of institutions and thus the capital markets in emerging economies. For example in Chile, domestic pension funds held over 50% of outstanding corporate, government and mortgage bonds by the 1990's and over 10% of equities (Walker and Lefort, 2000) . By 1999, pension fund and life insurance companies' financial holdings represented over 10% of the total savings in Chile (Iglesias, 2000) .
Given the differences in institutional ownership across markets, we consider the role of institutional shareholder monitoring in economies characterized by diffuse ownership and in economies characterized by dominant controlling shareholders.
The role of institutional shareholder monitoring in any economy is the subject of continuing debate. Shareholders, as the owners of the firm, have certain rights, including the right to elect the Board of Directors. The Board, as the agent of the shareholders, has the direct responsibility to monitor corporate managers and their performance. The potential for shareholder activism, in particular, institutional investor shareholder activism, arises when shareholders believe that the Board of Directors has failed in its duty. That is, the shareholders are dissatisfied with the performance of the Board of Directors (and presumably the firm). In other words, the potential for activism is high when agency costs are high. In such a case, shareholders can (1) 'vote with their feet,'
i.e., sell their shares; (2) hold their shares and voice their dissatisfaction, or (3) hold their shares and do nothing. Hirschman (1971) has characterized these alternatives as: exit, voice, and loyalty. The question naturally arises as to what conditions lead an investor to exercise the voice option rather than the other two.
The Institutional Investor as a Large Shareholder
As Roe (1990) has pointed out, it is not just the separation of ownership and control that gives rise to the agency problem between shareholders and managers, rather it is the atomistic or diffuse nature of corporate ownership, i.e., an ownership structure characterized by a large number of small shareholders.
Given a diffuse ownership structure, there is no incentive for an individual owner to monitor corporate management. The rationale is that the individual owner bears the entire monitoring costs, although the benefits accrue to all shareholders. Roe's point suggests that the magnitude and nature of agency problems is related to ownership structures. Given the differences in ownership structures around the world, one would expect differences in the form, consequences, and solutions to the shareholder-manager agency problem across countries. In countries where ownership structures are dominated by the existence of a large shareholder, there may be a lower likelihood of agency problems as envisioned by Berle and Means (1932) and Roe (1990) .
Numerous authors have argued that an important role for large shareholders is to ameliorate agency problems by monitoring or otherwise taking control of the corporation (Shleifer and Vishny (1986) , Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner (1993) , Huddart (1993) , Maug (1998), and Noe (1997) Empirical evidence on the role of large shareholders as monitors has supported this theory to some extent. For example, Bethel, Liebeskind, and Opler (1998) report that company performance improves after an activist investor purchases a block of shares. Kang and Shivdasani (1995) , and Kaplan and Minton (1994) find that the presence of large shareholders in a firm is associated with management turnover, suggesting that these shareholders provide a monitoring function. Further evidence is provided by Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) who report smaller "overpayment" in corporate takeovers when the bidding firm has a large shareholder.
Another perspective on the large shareholder arises when that shareholder is a lending institution. Previous research has argued that lenders occupy a unique position in a firm's corporate governance given their monitoring and control abilities. In particular, the argument has been made that banks have a comparative cost advantage in monitoring firms due to their access to inside information. The bank lenders' access to superior information, relative to the information available to bondholders, reduces potential agency costs of debt financing (Fama, 1985) .
There is also evidence concerning the role of lenders as equityholders in countries that do not have restrictions on equity investments by financial lending institutions. For example, in the U.S., for most of the twentieth century, banks were prohibited by law from holding equity in a firm, but in Japan, banks were 2 That is, the existence of a large shareholder can provide a partial solution to the free-rider problem inherent in diffusely owned companies pointed out by Grossman and Hart (1980) . permitted to take large equity positions in firms, including firms to which they made loans. One implication of these different restrictions is that if lending institutions who are equity holders are more effective monitors, then agency problems in Japan should be less than those in the U.S., everything else equal. Prowse (1990) concludes that agency problems in Japan are, in fact, lessened by the Japanese lenders' equity holdings, which suggests that lenders can contribute positively to a firm's performance through their equity positions.
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In support of this hypothesis, Kaplan and Minton (1994) study the appointment of former bank employees to boards of directors in Japanese firms and conclude that banks (along with corporate shareholders) are an important aspect of corporate governance in Japan. More recent research, however, has questioned the effectiveness of banks in governing corporations. In the case of Japan, Morck and Nakamura (1999) argue that bank intervention is in the short-term interests of the bank rather than the interests of the firms' shareholders. Moreover, Kang and Stulz (2000) report that, during the 1990's, bank-dependent firms experienced worse stock price performance than other firms. 5 For Germany, Boehmer (1999) reports that banks control a substantially higher fraction of corporate voting rights than cash-flow rights (due to proxy votes and board memberships). Since the banks typically have larger loan positions than equity investment in portfolio companies, it is unclear whether banks' voting power has been used in shareholders' interests. Indeed, Boehmer provides empirical evidence that bank control appears to have only a modest effect on a firm's stock market performance.
The evidence from studies comparing corporate governance structures and their effects should be interpreted with caution. For example, the observed differences in bank equity holdings between Germany, Japan, and the United 3 However, as pointed out by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) , because the large shareholder can only reap the gains to his or her own shares, even the existence of such a monitoring shareholder will still lead to too little monitoring. 4 He bases this conclusion on his finding of a significant negative relation between debt ratios and firms' potential for risky, suboptimal investments for U.S. firms and no significant relation for Japanese firms. 5 See Andersen and Campbell (2002) for a more detailed discussion of Japanese bank governance.
States did not arise in isolation, and may be related to other differences in corporate governance. Moreover, lenders may have different goals from other types of shareholders. Thus, as the papers discussed above suggest, it is not clear that lender equity positions would uniformly benefit corporate governance and firm performance.
Institutional Investors, Monitoring, and Information Transmission:
Theory and Evidence
Another potential role for large institutional investors could be to provide a credible mechanism for transmitting information to the financial markets, that is, to other investors (Chidambaran and John, 2000) . Large institutional investors can obtain private information from management and convey that information to other shareholders. But for such monitoring to be credible, the large shareholder would need to maintain their investment for a sufficiently long period of time and hold enough shares to mitigate the free-rider problem. The result is that, under certain conditions, there will be a payoff for the institutional investor who performs costly monitoring to oversee managers and a payoff for the manager who cooperates. Thus, Chidambaran and John argue that relationship investing is optimal for both the large investor and management. This view of a large investor who engages in non-control-related monitoring can be contrasted with that of Shleifer and Vishny (1986) who envision a large shareholder who would be willing to take control of the firm.
A differentiation can also be made between the monitoring incentives and abilities of institutional investors versus those of large non-institutional blockholders. Gorton and Kahl (1999) In studying the adoption of antitakeover amendments Borokhovich, Brunarski, and Parrino (2000) provide evidence consistent with the hypotheses of Gorton and Kahl (1999) and Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988) . Specifically, Even institutions that choose to sell their shares rather than trying to instigate change in the firm can affect corporate governance. As noted by Parrino, Sias and Starks (2000) , there are several potential effects from institutional selling of shares: downward price pressure due to supply-demand effects, information signals to other investors, and changes in shareholder composition. The first effect is supported by empirical evidence demonstrating that heavy institutional selling can put downward pressure on the stock price (e.g., Brown and Brooke, 1993) . Alternatively, institutional selling may be interpreted as bad news, thus triggering sales by other investors and further depressing the stock price. Finally, the composition of the investor base holding the shares may change, for example, from institutional investors with a long-term focus to investors with a more myopic view. This last effect may be important to directors if the types of institutions holding the stock affect share value or the management of the company.
Parrino, Sias and Starks (2000) find that those firms that fired their top executives had a significantly greater decline in institutional ownership in the year prior to the CEO turnover than firms experiencing voluntary CEO turnover.
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that institutional selling influences decisions by the board of directors -institutional investors selling a stock increases the likelihood a CEO is forced from office. 8 Further, the authors find that greater decreases in institutional ownership are associated with a greater probability of an outsider being appointed to succeed the CEO. This indicates that directors are more willing to break with the current corporate management and institute change.
Although a large institutional shareholder may receive benefits from monitoring there are also potential costs. For example, concentrated ownership may reduce market liquidity and thus reduce the ability of the investor to sell their shares (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993) ). This link between liquidity and monitoring (or control) has been addressed by a number of studies, including Coffee (1991) , Bhide (1994) , Maug (1998) and Kahn and Winton (1998) . One view is that liquidity and control are antithetical (Coffee (1991) and Bhide (1994) ).
Historically, institutional investors have preferred liquidity to control because the ability to exercise control over corporate management entails a sacrifice of liquidity -a sacrifice that is an unacceptable cost to many institutional investors (Coffee, 1991) . For example, in the U.S., while extensive regulation has promoted liquidity, it has also promoted diffuse, arm's length stock holding (Bhide, 1994 Bhide's view contrasts with the more recent work of Maug (1998) , Kahn and Winton (1998), and Noe (1997) . Maug has argued that the alleged trade-off between liquidity and control does not exist. Liquid markets make it less costly to sell a large stake, but also make it easier for investors to accumulate large stakes and to capitalize on shareholder activism. He concluded that the impact of liquidity on corporate control is unambiguously positive.
Kahn and Winton (1998) focused on how firm characteristics affect an institutional shareholder's decision to intervene into a corporation's decisionmaking process and the implications of this intervention for firm ownership structure. They showed that the intervention decision depends on the benefits from increasing value of the existing stake in the firm and the effects on the institution's trading profits. Noe (1997) demonstrates that a core group of institutional investors can naturally develop with the goal of monitoring the corporation and preventing managers from engaging in opportunism. In his model a wide range of institutions exist, from small to large, not all of which will be motivated to monitor.
Some will choose to be passive, but there is not a monotonic relation between size of shareholdings and incentives. Noe also shows that institutional investors can be motivated to monitor managers because they can gain from the monitoring, even in the presence of costly monitoring, no initial stake in the corporation, and free-rider problems. He further suggests that if the informed institutional investors increase the size of their shareholdings, that is, increase ownership concentration in the stock, it may actually lower bid-ask spreads.
In summary, the consensus in the literature is that there are many costs associated with shareholder activism and increased ownership concentration.
Moreover, existing regulations impair governance by encouraging diffuse ownership and liquidity while simultaneously discouraging active investing.
Despite these barriers to shareholder action, there has been an increased amount of non-control-related monitoring over the recent past by large blockholders and by institutional investors.
Institutional Shareholder Activism across Countries
The U.S. Experience
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Given the increasing influence of institutional investors in the financial markets, it is perhaps not surprising that they have become more active in their role as shareholders. The activism by these investors has been both private and public, with the public activism perhaps most visible in the United States.
Regulation in the United States has strongly influenced institutional investors' three action choices of exit, voice, or loyalty. In the early 1900s, insurance companies, mutual funds, and banks began to become active in corporate governance, i.e., exercise voice. In all cases, however, laws were passed to limit the power of financial intermediaries and to prevent them from having an active role in corporate governance (Roe, 1993) . In particular, banks were prohibited from owning equity directly. Thus, the corporate governance system in the United States has historically differed from that in other countries prior to forced turnovers when these firms typically experience negative market-adjusted returns. 9 For surveys of shareholder activism, see Black (1998) , Gillan and Starks (1998) Later, they changed their strategy somewhat by negotiating more directly with corporate management and by publicly targeting corporations through the media.
In addition to public pension funds, private pension and mutual fund advisors also began to take more active roles in the corporate governance of firms in which they hold investments (although their activism has tended to be less publicized). For instance, some money managers have purportedly influenced high profile decisions to replace top managers (Myerson, 1993; Pensions and Investments, 1993) . Others, such as the Lens Fund and Relational Investors, have specifically targeted poorly performing companies with a perceived poor governance structure and have actively pressured management for reform. (1999) . 10 The Labor Department has oversight responsibility for corporate pension funds through ERISA (the Employee Retirement Income Security Act). 11 The major issues raised by these proposals dealt with corporate governance, in particular, the problems arising from the misalignment of the interests of managers and shareholders.
In a survey of 231 portfolio managers and institutional shareholders, 77%
of the respondents had participated in some form of activism in the previous year, either by communicating their opinions directly to a board (verbally or by letter), seeking more involvement in board oversight, sponsoring a shareholder resolution, or voting in favor of a shareholder resolution (Directors and Boards, 1997) . According to Ettorre (1996) , "Fifteen years ago, the CEO and CFO did not know major holders and really didn't care. CEOs are now more accessible to money managers." This attitude demonstrates the increasing importance of institutional investors.
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Although there has been activism on the part of private U.S. pension funds, and the U.S. Labor Department has encouraged such activities, corporate pension funds in general have been reluctant to engage in activism against other corporations. One argument for this reluctance is a fear that the activism could result in retaliation. Because of business relations with the corporation, pressure -sensitive institutional investors may be compelled to vote with the management even if contrary to their fiduciary interests (Pound (1988) and Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) ). Thus, there is a presumption that corporate pension funds have a conflict of interest in monitoring management at other corporations.
Further, Romano (1993) cites a widely held hypothesis that public pension funds are more effective monitors of management because they vote their own shares, in contrast to private pension funds that typically delegate their voting to external money managers. However, she finds no evidence that this hypothesis is valid.
According to a survey of institutional investors from the IRRC, there is no significant difference in voting policy between public and private pension funds; both groups have supported management over the survey period.
One other study has attempted to determine whether there are differences across institutional investors in regard to shareholder activism. In a survey of the 40 largest pension funds, 40 largest investment managers, and 20 largest charitable foundations, Useem, Bowman, Myatt, and Irvine (1993) Monks (1995) makes the point that public pension funds would have a more natural role as valuable allies for activism by other investors rather than as primary activists themselves.
Effectiveness of institutional shareholder activism
Measuring the effectiveness of shareholder activism is problematic. First, it is difficult to determine the activism's outcome and whether it has had positive consequences for the firm. For example, after the submission of a shareholder proposal, we can explore whether changes in the firm's governance structure reflect the intentions of the activists. That is, do firms repeal their antitakeover amendments, change their compensation plans or change the structure of their board of directors after shareholder proposals are submitted? But there is the problem of determining whether any changes that do occur have been caused by the activism and whether the changes have been beneficial, that is, whether they actually result in economic changes for the targeted firm. For example, one major goal of shareholder activists has been increased board independence.
Although we can observe whether there are more independent directors, it is difficult to directly attribute the increase to shareholder activism. More importantly, it is difficult to assess whether changing the composition of the board in this way actually results in economic changes for the corporation.
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A second problem arises in that much of the activism is conducted "behind the scenes" through private negotiations where there is no external observation of the event. For example, California Public Employees Retirement System 13 For an analysis of whether board independence results in improved performance for firms, see Bhagat and Black (1998a) . For a more general survey of the empirical evidence on the relation between the composition of the board of directors and firm performance, see Bhagat and Black (1998b) . shareholder activism and these changes.
Institutional Investor Monitoring in Other Countries
The relatively active role of institutions in the U.S. contrasts with that of institutional investors in other countries. For example, although it is estimated that institutional investors own between 65 and 80% of the equities in the U.K.
they have, at least historically, not voted their shares. 14 Mallin (1995) Secretary used the "bully pulpit" to pressure institutional investors to vote their shares, threatening legislative action in the absence of any improvement. Indeed, this appeared to spark the NAPF to encourage members to vote. Although voting turnout of 50% is evidence of an increase, it is low by U.S. standards. In the U.S., voting turnout, the level of votes represented at the annual meeting, can easily reach 70-80% at many companies (Bethel and Gillan, 2001 .)
The differential between voting turnout in the U.S. and in the U.K. may be due in part to differences in the institutional and regulatory environments between the two countries. 14 Also see Ersoy-Bozcuk and Lasfer (2000) . 15 The National Association of Pension Funds is the principal U.K. body representing the interests of occupational pension funds. With more than £450 billion of pension fund assets, its membership includes companies, local authorities, and public sector bodies.
to those under ERISA "..articulating the duties of managers to intervene in companies -by voting or otherwise -where there is a reasonable expectation that doing so might raise the value of the investment." More generally, differences in countries' legal and financial systems have led to a disparity in corporate governance systems. For example, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that investor protection and corporate governance are stronger where the legal system is based on common law as opposed to civil law. Roe (1990) contends that in the early part of the twentieth century, institutions in the U.S. became active in corporate governance, but their participation was curtailed by the federal government. In contrast, the roles of institutional investors in other countries differ due to differences in their development and differences in the laws that govern their behavior. It has been suggested that these laws are the major reason for 17 It appears that the company has responded to this condemnation. Vivendi recently eliminated a long-standing policy of double voting rights (a process by which shares held for more than two years are entitled to two votes each instead of one), and at the annual shareholder's meeting on April 24, 2001, submitted to shareholders a resolution aimed at eliminating the cap on voting rights for holdings in excess of 2%. Company representatives stated that these actions are evolutionary differences between corporate governance systems in the United
States and those in other countries, such as Germany or Japan. By design, institutions, particularly banks, have played a large role in the ownership and monitoring of corporations in Germany (the Hausbank) and Japan (the Keiretsu).
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Shareholder protections also affect the ability of a firm to raise capital, including capital from institutional investors. As the demand for funds increases in emerging markets, foreign institutions will demand stronger legal protections and stronger corporate governance. Moreover, financial liberalization and the ensuing development of pension systems and other domestic institutional investors may provide a catalyst in improving legal protections and corporate governance. More generally, as alluded to above, the protection of shareholders, particularly minority shareholders, is important for corporate governance and the continued ability of firms in emerging markets to attract external capital (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
Differences in Ownership Structure across Countries
In many economies, large shareholders and concentrated ownership, as opposed to institutional ownership, are important factors in a firm's governance structure. Majluf, Abarca, Rodriguez, and Fuentes (1998) provide striking evidence of these differences. Although the largest shareholders in Chile control 40% of the shares of the largest companies, this drops to 22% for Germany, and 7% for Japan. These findings can be contrasted with the U.S. where there is substantially more dispersion in share ownership and the largest shareholder often controls as little as 5% of voting rights.
As noted earlier, the agency problems between managers and shareholders as envisioned by Berle and Means (1932) and Roe (1990) may not be prevalent in economies where ownership structures differ. Indeed, LaPorta, consistent with the implementation of the "…best international practices in terms of corporate governance."
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1998) concluded that in many economies the primary agency problem is that of restricting expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders, rather than that of restricting the activities of professional managers unaccountable to shareholders. The authors reported that, for a sample of large publicly traded firms around the world (the largest 20 firms in each country), 36% were widely-held, 30% were familycontrolled, 18% were state-controlled and the remaining 15% exhibited a variety of other ownership structures. The authors found little use of differential voting rights, but widespread use of pyramidal structures, to control firms. Some 26% of their firms had pyramidal structures (multiple layers of corporate ownership which permit high ownership of voting rights). In the average country, the ultimate family owners controlled, on average, 25% of the value of the largest 20 firms. Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2000) argue that the separation of voting from cash-flow rights in East Asian corporations is associated with lower market value, and the potential expropriation of minority shareholders. Faccio, 18 In other markets family or business groups appear to be dominant players. See, for example, Campbell and Keys (2001) for a discussion of the chaebol in South Korea and Khanna (2000) for Lang and Young (2000) argue that capital markets generally appear capable of containing expropriation within tightly controlled groups by requiring that higher dividends be paid to corporations affiliated with such groups. This is especially true at companies exhibiting a wide discrepancy between ownership and control.
By contrast, the authors argue that capital markets are ineffective at containing expropriation of corporations that are loosely affiliated to groups, that is, groups whose control links all exceed 10% but do not all exceed 20%. Specifically, capital markets fail to extract more dividends from such corporations, and a greater discrepancy between ownership and control is associated with lower dividend rates. Again, expropriation of minority shareholders is a major source of agency costs in Asian economies.
Thus, ownership structures and the role of institutional investors differ across developed economies, including those in Asia and Western Europe. As we discuss below, the same is true in transitional economies.
Ownership in Transitional Economies
In the context of developing economies and markets the evidence on ownership structure and control is more preliminary. Djankov (2000) finds large differences in ownership structure across six newly independent state countries:
Georgia, Kazakstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine. These differences in large part are a result of the country's choice of privatization process. Companies in Georgia and Ukraine, where managers were favored in the privatization process, are characterized by high managerial ownership (53% and 46% respectively). In contrast, markets where mass privatization dominated, such as Kazakstan and the Kyrgyz Republic, have higher levels of outside ownership (37% and 21% respectively.) In Russia, privatizing firms primarily chose 51% insider ownership with the remaining shares being given to investment funds or retained by the state. Moreover, in each of these markets the State still has significant ownership of many companies. A further factor is the low level of foreign ownership, ranging from 0.9% in Ukraine to 6.8% in business groups more generally.
Kazakstan by 1999. Djankov suggests that these low levels of foreign ownership are due to governance mechanisms external to the firm, including foreign ownership restrictions, the legal framework, and the lack of development of secondary capital markets. Similarly, Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (1999) are other companies, 6% are government, and less than 8% are mutual funds, pension funds or insurance companies.
This evidence supports the contention that institutional investors, foreign or domestic, may currently play a limited role in many emerging equity markets.
However, one would anticipate that this role will evolve with the increased demands of these companies and countries for additional capital. For example, in Brazil, Oehl (2000) argues that local institutional investors have the potential to be an important force in improving minority shareholder rights.
In addition to increased investment by domestic institutions, some countries have experienced an influx of capital, primarily from foreign institutional investors. Indeed, in some cases foreign institutions hold more shares than do domestic institutions. For example, recently Mexico's stock markets had over 30% foreign investment, while its domestic mutual fund industry held about 1% of outstanding equity (Cervantes, 1999) .
The question of the influence of foreign investors is significant because they have become such a large component of some markets. Several authors have studied whether the presence of foreign investors has a significant impact on financial markets operations and valuation. For example, Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (1999) found that after liberalization in an emerging stock market, capital flows to that market increase by 1.4% of market capitalization annually for three years after the liberalization and then the increase slows down. They also concluded that there is evidence of a permanent price pressure effect from these capital flows, but that the actual return effect is not solely due to price pressure.
Finally, they find that capital tends to leave more quickly than it arrives. Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999) examined whether foreign investors are a destabilizing influence on the Korean stock market and conclude that they are not. Similarly, in a review of the literature, Stulz (1999) concluded that opening a country to international investors decreased firms' cost of capital without adverse effects on its securities markets. Specifically, he concludes that there is no evidence that volatility, contagion or destabilization increase following a liberalization of a country's financial markets.
Interaction between Ownership Structures
The trade-off between the concentration and dispersion of ownership raises further questions. The first is the extent to which diverse types of equity Regardless of the interaction between different types of owner, the implications of the previous research are that the presence of institutional investors should lead to more informative prices, and consequently lower monitoring costs for all investors. Thus, the outcome should be better monitoring of managers and better corporate governance.
The Evolving Environment
We speculate that in the future increased ownership by foreign institutional investors will be an important influence in many economies, particularly emerging and simply abandon many of these markets." (Karmin, 2000) . Of note, is that The decision to change allocations was based on a review of each market based on factors including: market liquidity and volatility, market regulation and investor protections, capital market openness, settlement proficiency, and transaction costs (accounting for 50 percent of the review).
and Poor's has developed a corporate governance rating system for emerging markets (Cullison, 2000) . Finally, Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia's Emerging Markets Division has also released corporate governance rankings for 495 companies in 25 countries. The existence of such services reflects the perceived desire of institutional investors to have that information in order to make investment decisions. investors as large shareholders should or will provide such monitoring depends in part on the constraints they are subject to, their objectives, and their preferences for liquidity. These characteristics also vary across countries, leading to differences in the involvement of institutional investors in corporate governance practices. As markets have become more integrated, however, there has been some convergence in the behavior and practices of institutional Political stability, financial transparency and labor standards accounted for the remaining 50 percent.
Conclusions
investors. The evidence also suggests that as foreign institutional investors enter a country, although their trading may differ from that of domestic investors, they do not constitute a threat in terms of destabilizing financial markets.
Countries also differ with regard to the existence of large blockholders in their markets, whether institutional investors, other corporations (or business groups), family groups, or lending institutions. These differences lead to variation in corporate governance practices and differences in the role and influence of institutional investors. The relative importance of institutional investors in corporate governance varies across countries, due in part to legal and regulatory systems and in part to the manner in which the role of institutional investors has evolved. Of particular importance is the interrelation between institutional investors and other factors of corporate governance such as the legal and regulatory system, the market for corporate control, the board of directors, other large blockholders, lenders, and employees.
Although there may be some convergence in these systems across countries, because of the endogenous nature of the interrelation between the factors of corporate governance, the evolution will most likely vary across countries.
In some cases financial liberalization and the development of domestic institutions will influence change. This will likely spur the development of both debt and equity markets. In other cases, foreign institutional investors will play a major role, particularly given the capital they control. On balance, we would expect that institutional investors will increase the liquidity, volatility, and price informativeness of the markets in which they invest. In turn, the increased information provided by institutional trading should result in better monitoring of corporations and in better corporate governance structures.
